Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union (EU) has positioned itself as a staunch supporter of Ukraine, imposing multiple rounds of sanctions on Russia to curb its war machine. These sanctions target Russia’s economy, energy sector, and military capabilities, with a particular focus on the so-called "shadow fleet"—a network of aging, often uninsured vessels used to transport Russian oil and gas in circumvention of Western restrictions. Despite these efforts, accusations of hypocrisy have emerged, pointing to the complicity of certain European countries and companies in enabling Russia’s shadow fleet, thereby indirectly fueling the war against Ukraine. This article explores the mechanisms through which European entities have contributed to Russia’s sanction-evading tactics, the environmental and security risks posed by the shadow fleet, and the broader implications of Europe’s inconsistent stance on the Ukraine conflict. It also critically examines whether these actions reflect deliberate hypocrisy or systemic failures in enforcement.

The Shadow Fleet: Russia’s Sanction-Evasion Tool

Russia’s shadow fleet consists of approximately 1,300 vessels, primarily oil tankers, registered in jurisdictions with lax regulations and often operating with opaque ownership structures. These ships facilitate the transport of Russian oil and gas, bypassing the G7-imposed price cap of $60 per barrel (later adjusted to $47.6 in 2025) and EU sanctions banning Russian seaborne crude imports. The fleet’s operations are critical to Russia’s war economy, as oil and gas exports account for a significant portion of its revenue, estimated to have decreased by €38 billion since the introduction of the price cap. By engaging in practices such as ship-to-ship transfers, manipulating location signals, and operating under flags of convenience (e.g., Panama or Liberia), these vessels obscure the origin of Russian oil, enabling sales to markets like China and India at prices above the cap. The shadow fleet’s activities are not merely economic; they pose significant environmental and security risks. Many of these vessels are old, poorly maintained, and inadequately insured, raising fears of oil spills that could devastate maritime ecosystems. A 2024 report by the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) highlighted that 72% of Russian seaborne oil in the first half of 2024 was transported through Baltic and Black Sea ports on shadow tankers averaging 18 years old. Incidents like the collision of the shadow tanker Andromeda Star near Denmark in March 2024 underscore the potential for environmental catastrophe. Additionally, the fleet has been implicated in hybrid warfare, with vessels like the Eagle S suspected of sabotaging critical infrastructure, such as the Finland-Estonia Estlink 2 cable in January 2025. These actions highlight the fleet’s role not only in funding Russia’s war but also in threatening European security.

Europe’s Role in Sustaining the Shadow Fleet

Despite the EU’s public commitment to dismantling Russia’s war economy, evidence suggests that European countries and companies have played a significant role in enabling the shadow fleet. A 2025 investigation by Follow the Money revealed that Western shipowners, particularly from Greece, Germany, Norway, and the UK, have sold over 230 aging tankers to the shadow fleet, pocketing more than $6 billion. These vessels, often destined for scrapping, were sold at inflated prices due to high demand driven by Russia’s need to circumvent sanctions. Greek shipowners, in particular, have been singled out, with reports indicating that a sizable share of Russia’s shadow fleet consists of former Greek-owned vessels. This practice has continued despite the EU’s increasing sanctions, which have targeted nearly 400 shadow fleet vessels by July 2025, banning them from European ports and services. The sale of these tankers is not explicitly prohibited under current EU sanctions, exposing a critical loophole. While the EU has imposed port access bans and targeted individual vessels, operators, and companies involved in the shadow fleet, it has refrained from banning the sale or ownership transfer of tankers to Russia. This omission has allowed European firms to profit from Russia’s war-driven demand for vessels, indirectly funneling billions into Moscow’s coffers. Critics argue that this reflects a form of hypocrisy: European nations publicly condemn Russia’s aggression while their private sectors enable its financial lifeline. As one expert noted, “Everybody with an old ship in Europe sold it and it ended up in Russian trading… It would have been impossible not to know the ultimate fate of that vessel.” Moreover, countries like Greece, Cyprus, and Malta, which host large merchant marine fleets, have resisted stricter sanctions on the shadow fleet. In 2023, these nations expressed concerns about proposals to ban vessels suspected of carrying Russian oil, citing difficulties in identifying illicit activities and the economic impact on their shipping industries. While most of their fleets operate legally, some vessels engage in suspicious practices, such as ship-to-ship transfers near Greece or Malta, which facilitate sanction evasion. This resistance highlights a tension within the EU: the prioritization of national economic interests over collective action against Russia.

Broader Hypocrisy in Europe’s Stance

The accusation of European hypocrisy extends beyond the shadow fleet to broader inconsistencies in the EU’s response to the Ukraine war. Social media and global observers have criticized the West, including Europe, for perceived double standards in its support for Ukraine compared to other conflicts. Posts on X and reports from 2022–2023 noted that European leaders have used robust language to condemn Russia’s invasion while remaining more restrained in addressing other occupations, raising questions about selective application of international norms. For instance, the EU’s swift condemnation of Russia’s actions contrasts with its reluctance to sanction for example Azerbaijan or Turkey, prompting accusations of a “rules-based order” applied selectively based on geopolitical interests. Within the context of the Ukraine war, some European countries have been accused of indirectly supporting Russia through continued energy imports. Despite sanctions, certain EU nations, such as Slovakia, have resisted proposals to halt Russian gas supplies due to their reliance on them. Posts on X have claimed that EU countries have clandestinely purchased Russian energy via shipping routes through ports like Dunkirk, circumventing sanctions. Additionally, investigations have documented Russian tankers delivering oil to EU countries like Romania and Bulgaria, despite sanctions, often under flags of convenience. These actions undermine the EU’s stated commitment to reducing Russia’s energy revenues, which fell by 13.7% in March 2025 compared to March 2023.

The EU’s Response and Its Limitations

The EU has taken steps to address the shadow fleet, particularly in recent years. The 17th sanctions package, adopted in May 2025, targeted nearly 200 vessels and included Russia’s oil giant Surgutneftegas, aiming to curb the fleet’s operational capacity. The 18th package, approved in July 2025, added 105 more ships and lowered the oil price cap to $47.6 per barrel. The EU has also sanctioned entities in third countries, such as China, India, and the UAE, for facilitating Russia’s sanction evasion. In the Baltic Sea, where 50% of shadow fleet oil exports pass, countries like Denmark, Estonia, and Finland have increased maritime oversight, requiring proof of insurance from suspected vessels. However, these measures face significant challenges. Enforcing sanctions across global networks is complex, as Russia relies on non-EU countries to sustain its shadow fleet. The fleet’s use of ship-to-ship transfers and lax jurisdictions complicates tracking and attribution. Moreover, the economic impact of sanctions on EU member states creates resistance, as seen in Slovakia’s objections. The EU’s failure to ban tanker sales outright and the continued involvement of European shipowners highlight a gap between rhetoric and action. Critics argue that these shortcomings reflect not only logistical difficulties but also a lack of political will to fully confront Russia’s war economy.

Environmental and Security Implications

The shadow fleet’s environmental risks are a pressing concern for Europe, particularly in the Baltic Sea, a critical trade route and ecological zone. The KSE has warned that an oil spill from an underinsured shadow tanker could cause “unthinkable environmental damage.” The fleet’s involvement in hybrid warfare, such as sabotaging underwater cables, further escalates its threat. The January 2025 incident involving the Eagle S prompted Finland to detain the vessel on suspicion of vandalism, signaling growing alarm over Russia’s use of the fleet for non-economic purposes. These risks underscore the urgency of a coordinated European response. Proposals to limit shadow fleet transit through European waters or impose stricter insurance requirements could enhance enforcement but face legal hurdles under international maritime law, which guarantees the right of innocent passage. Such measures would require unprecedented political resolve, as they risk escalating tensions with Russia, as demonstrated by the 2025 incident in which a Russian fighter jet deterred an Estonian patrol boat from inspecting a shadow tanker.

Europe’s role in enabling Russia’s shadow fleet, whether through tanker sales or lax enforcement, highlights a troubling inconsistency in its response to the Ukraine war. While the EU has imposed significant sanctions, targeting over 2,400 individuals and entities and reducing Russia’s energy revenues, the persistence of loopholes and the complicity of European firms undermine these efforts. The shadow fleet’s environmental and security threats, combined with its role in funding Russia’s aggression, demand a more assertive response. Closing loopholes, banning tanker sales, and enhancing maritime enforcement could strengthen the EU’s position, but these steps require overcoming internal divisions and economic concerns.