The International Criminal Court (ICC) occupies a paradoxical space in the Russian war against Ukraine. While the Court has issued arrest warrants for President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials, the same legal machinery could theoretically be turned against Ukraine. This investigation examines whether Russia can, through proxy states in the Global South, manipulate the ICC’s procedures to indict Ukrainian political and military leaders, discredit Kyiv’s victim narrative, and fracture Western unity. The study dissects the jurisdictional architecture of the ICC’s Ukraine situation, identifies concrete mechanisms such as state party referrals, amicus curiae interventions, proprio motu prosecutorial nudging, victim representations, and budget politics. It maps the Global South’s historical grievances against the Court and Moscow’s diplomatic cultivation of those grievances.

Since the full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the International Criminal Court has emerged as a central pillar of the accountability architecture. Forty three states parties referred the situation to the Prosecutor, an unprecedented collective action. In March 2023, Pre Trial Chamber II issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova Belova for the unlawful deportation of children. Subsequent warrants targeted military commanders Sergei Kobylash and Viktor Sokolov, and former Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. These steps were celebrated in Western capitals as a triumph of international law. Yet a parallel question has begun to circulate in diplomatic back channels and Russian strategic thinking: can the same court, with its universalist mandate and its historical baggage of selectivity accusations, be wielded against Ukraine? Russia is not a state party to the Rome Statute and does not recognize the Court’s jurisdiction. However, Moscow maintains deep ties with numerous states across Africa, Asia, and Latin America that are parties. Many of these Global South states have long accused the ICC of neo-colonial bias for its exclusive focus on African defendants during its first two decades. Russia actively fuels this narrative. By activating these allies, Moscow could pursue a strategy of “legal mirroring”: using the Court’s own tools to investigate alleged crimes by Ukrainian forces, to request arrest warrants for Ukrainian officials, and to paralyze the ICC’s legitimacy by exposing its uneven application of justice. 1. The ICC and Ukraine: Jurisdictional Framework and Scope of Investigations Understanding the potential for instrumentalization requires a precise grasp of what the Court can and cannot do in the Ukraine situation. Ukraine is not a state party to the Rome Statute, although it signed the treaty in 2000. It has not ratified. Nevertheless, Kyiv lodged two ad hoc declarations under Article 12(3) accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory. The first declaration, submitted in April 2014, covered alleged crimes committed from 21 November 2013 to 22 February 2014 during the Maidan protests. The second declaration, lodged in September 2015, extended jurisdiction on an open ended basis from 20 February 2014 onward, encompassing the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Following the 2022 full scale invasion, Ukraine clarified that the declaration covers all crimes committed on its territory by any perpetrator, regardless of nationality. The jurisdictional result is asymmetric. The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed on the territory of Ukraine. This includes crimes committed by Russian nationals, by Ukrainian nationals, and by any other persons on that territory. Because Russia is not a state party and has not accepted jurisdiction, its nationals cannot be prosecuted for crimes committed on Russian territory unless the Security Council refers the situation, which is politically blocked. But the ICC can investigate crimes committed by Russian forces inside Ukraine, and it can equally investigate crimes committed by Ukrainian forces or officials inside Ukraine. The Prosecutor, Karim A. A. Khan, opened an investigation on 2 March 2022 after the coordinated referral by 43 states parties. That investigation is holistic; it examines all crimes within the jurisdiction committed by any party to the conflict. As of mid 2025, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has conducted numerous field missions, interviewed thousands of witnesses, and collected evidence across the breadth of alleged atrocity sites. The crucial point for this investigation is that the OTP has publicly confirmed it is scrutinizing allegations against Ukrainian forces. In December 2022, Prosecutor Khan stated: “We are examining allegations of crimes committed by all parties.” Ukrainian authorities have themselves referred several incidents involving their own soldiers for national investigation and prosecution, signalling an awareness that the ICC’s lens points in multiple directions. The legal door is thus open. The question is whether third states of the Global South can push that door wider and steer the investigation to focus disproportionately on Ukrainian defendants, thereby serving Russian geopolitical objectives. 2. Russia’s Strategic Interest in Weaponizing International Justice Moscow has consistently condemned the ICC’s arrest warrants as null and void, announced criminal investigations against the Prosecutor and judges, and portrayed the Court as a tool of Western hegemony. Despite this official repudiation, Russian statecraft has a long tradition of exploiting the contradictions within liberal international institutions to blunt their impact, delegitimize them, and create reciprocal pain. Weaponizing the ICC against Ukraine offers several strategic dividends. First, a parallel focus on Ukrainian crimes would fracture the narrative of a clear aggressor victim binary. The OTP’s work on both sides could be spun to argue that “both sides commit crimes” and that the “Kiev regime” is equally culpable. This moral equivalence campaign, if amplified through Global South voices, weakens Western diplomatic cohesion, particularly in states where public opinion is already skeptical of double standards. Second, arrest warrants for Ukrainian political or military leaders, even if never executed, would embarrass Kyiv and its backers, complicate diplomatic travel, and taint Ukraine’s efforts to join the European Union, where alignment with international justice norms is a formal criterion. Third, a prolonged procedural battle over Ukrainian liability could divert OTP resources, delaying more consequential investigations against Russian high command. Fourth, the sight of Global South states states that often bear the brunt of ICC scrutiny actively using the Court against a Western aligned government would flip the neo-colonial script and bolster Moscow’s narrative of a multipolar world correcting institutional imbalances. Russia has already experimented with similar “mirror” legal tactics. After the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in 2014, Moscow propagated alternative forensics and encouraged misleading filings with the Dutch led Joint Investigation Team, while simultaneously using its UN Security Council veto to block a tribunal. In the realm of human rights, Russia promoted resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council condemning neo Nazism and xenophobia, pointedly referencing Ukraine. Using the ICC through proxies is a logical escalation of that lawfare playbook. The Kremlin’s challenge is that it cannot act directly because it is outside the Rome Statute system, hence the turn toward third country intermediaries. 3. Mechanisms for Third-State Engagement at the ICC: Legal Gateways Third states that are parties to the Rome Statute possess multiple procedural levers to influence the direction of investigations and prosecutions. Global South states, acting in concert or individually, could deploy the following tools to amplify an investigation into alleged Ukrainian crimes. State Party Referrals under Article 14 Any state party may refer a situation to the Prosecutor in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction appear to have been committed. The 2022 collective referral already encompasses the entire situation in Ukraine, including crimes by all sides. A new referral is not legally necessary, but a supplementary referral specifically highlighting Ukrainian atrocities would carry political weight. It would signal that a bloc of states believes the OTP is neglecting “victims on the other side.” The Prosecutor would be forced to respond, and failure to visibly pursue those allegations could trigger accusations of bias. A well drafted referral accompanied by a detailed dossier of evidence could compel preliminary examination or deeper investigative scrutiny. In the Court’s early years, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic self referred their own situations, seeking prosecutions of rebel groups while hoping to shield government forces. Self referrals taught the Court a painful lesson about selectivity. An allied third state referral against Ukraine would invert that dynamic: an external party pointing the finger at a government that has itself invited ICC scrutiny. Proprio Motu Investigations and Article 15 Communications The Prosecutor may initiate investigations on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction, subject to Pre Trial Chamber authorization. Non state actors and states commonly submit “Article 15 communications” requesting the Prosecutor to open an investigation or to expand an existing one. Civil society organizations, often funded by state donors, use these submissions to advocate for particular lines of inquiry. Russia could channel funding through opaque intermediaries to Global South based NGOs and legal groups that would then file voluminous communications detailing alleged Ukrainian war crimes, such as indiscriminate shelling of Donetsk, execution of prisoners of war, use of prohibited weapons, or attacks on civilian infrastructure in Crimea. The OTP’s preliminary examination and investigation sections are obliged to assess all credible information. A sustained campaign of detailed, well documented submissions would absorb analytical capacity and oblige the Prosecutor to report on steps taken regarding those allegations. Victim Participation and Representation under Article 68 Victims of crimes may participate in proceedings and make representations to the Court at various stages. If the OTP decides to narrow its initial Ukraine cases to Russian perpetrators, victims of alleged Ukrainian crimes, real or manufactured, could seek recognition as participants. Through legal representatives based in Global South jurisdictions with strong ties to Moscow, these victims could petition the Pre Trial Chamber to compel the Prosecutor to investigate their harm. They could also seek reparations orders. While the Rome Statute’s victim participation framework is designed to empower genuine victims, it is susceptible to organized lawfare when combined with state backing. Russia has extensive experience in mobilizing “civil society” proxies from the self proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, many of whom have fled to Russia and could provide testimony, real or coached. With support from sympathetic African or Latin American NGOs and law firms, victim dossiers could enter the Court. Amicus Curiae Submissions and Observations The Chambers may permit states, organizations, and individuals to submit amicus curiae observations on legal and factual issues. Global South states could file amicus briefs in the Ukraine situation, arguing, for instance, that complementarity demands the ICC defer to Ukrainian national proceedings only if those proceedings are genuine, and that Kyiv’s domestic handling of its own soldiers’ alleged crimes is a sham. Such briefs could be coordinated with legal academics from prestigious universities in South Africa, Brazil, or Malaysia to add gravitas. The amicus route does not compel action, but it shapes the judicial discourse and plants seeds of doubt about Ukraine’s good faith that can sprout in future admissibility challenges. Budgetary and Oversight Functions of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) The ASP approves the ICC’s budget and provides oversight. Although the Prosecutor is independent, the ASP can request thematic reports, question resource allocations, and pass resolutions that signal political expectations. A bloc of Global South states could demand that the OTP allocate proportionate resources to investigating Ukrainian crimes, citing the principle of impartiality. They could threaten to withhold their assessed contributions or to oppose budget increases unless the Prosecutor demonstrates even handedness. Given the Court’s chronic underfunding, such budgetary leverage is not trivial. The African Union has previously used ASP sessions to protest alleged anti African bias and to demand scrutiny of Western actions. Non Cooperation and Diplomatic Isolation as a Sword Conversely, the threat of withdrawing cooperation could be deployed to extract concessions. If Global South states that are parties signal that they might refuse to execute future ICC arrest warrants against Russian officials unless Ukrainian officials are also targeted, the Court’s enforcement crisis would deepen. This linkage politics may not directly force the OTP’s hand, but it creates a toxic environment in which every action against Russia becomes politically more costly, indirectly incentivizing the Prosecutor to demonstrate balance by pursuing Ukrainian suspects. 4. The Global South as a Proxy: Political Will, Grievances, and Infrastructure For Russia’s hypothetical exploitation strategy to function, it requires willing partners. The Global South is not a monolithic bloc, but a diverse constellation of states with varying relationships to the ICC, Russia, and the West. Several structural factors make parts of this constituency plausible intermediaries. Historical Grievances Against the ICC The Court’s credibility deficit in Africa and beyond is well documented. Until 2021, every person convicted or prosecuted by the ICC was African. The African Union repeatedly expressed concerns that the Court was a neo colonial instrument targeting weak states while ignoring crimes committed by powerful ones. In 2016, Burundi, South Africa, and The Gambia announced withdrawal (though The Gambia and South Africa reversed their decisions). Kenya mounted a fierce diplomatic campaign against the Court during the Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto cases. Although the situation has diversified with investigations in Georgia, Palestine, Afghanistan, and Ukraine, the perception of a double standard persists. Russia actively amplifies this narrative, contrasting the swift ICC focus on Russian actions with the prolonged delays in investigating alleged UK crimes in Iraq or US actions in Afghanistan. For many Global South diplomats, the Ukraine situation offers a chance to demonstrate that the ICC can indeed apply justice symmetrically, thereby validating their long standing critiques and saving the Court from accusations of one sidedness. Russia’s Diplomatic and Economic Webs Moscow has spent decades cultivating elites and publics across Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Southeast Asia through arms sales, mercenary deployments (via the Wagner Group, now Africa Corps), energy investments, scholarship programs, and anti colonial rhetoric. This yields tangible leverage. The Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Sudan host Russian military advisors and depend on Moscow’s diplomatic shielding at the UN. South Africa, a BRICS partner, has a powerful ruling party faction sympathetic to Russia’s historical anti apartheid support. Brazil under certain administrations has questioned the ICC’s legitimacy and championed sovereign immunity. In Asia, states like Bangladesh and Cambodia, while not pro Russia per se, are receptive to arguments about Western hypocrisy. Russia can offer these states tangible benefits, such as discounted grain or fertilizers, in exchange for symbolic or substantive moves at the ICC. Crucially, many of these states are ICC members: 33 African states, 19 Asia Pacific states, and 28 Latin American and Caribbean states are parties. The pool of potential proxies is large. Diplomatic Vehicles: The Non Aligned Movement, BRICS, and Regional Organizations The Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and BRICS provide ready platforms for coordinating legal and political strategies. NAM’s 120 members include a majority of ICC states parties. In October 2022, NAM issued a statement expressing concern about the “politicization of international justice,” language that aligns with Russian talking points. Within BRICS, a common judicial forum is emerging, and Russia chairs several working groups. A coordinated strategy could be forged in these venues, where anti hegemonic discourse resonates. Moscow’s Network of NGOs and Media Russian state funded entities such as the Russkiy Mir Foundation, RT, and Sputnik, along with think tanks like the Strategic Culture Foundation, operate globally, often in concert with local activists. Moscow also funds African and Asian civil society organizations that promote traditional values and anti imperialism. These networks could be repurposed to generate human rights documentation that flows into Article 15 communications, to recruit “victims” for ICC participation, and to produce academic critiques of the Prosecutor’s choices. The production of parallel evidence by entities like the “International Public Tribunal for Ukraine” a Russian organized civil society initiative that conducted mock trials in 2023 shows Moscow’s willingness to create a parallel legal narrative. 5. Exploitation Scenarios: From Referrals to Arrest Warrants Building on the mechanisms and political feasibility, five concrete scenarios illustrate how Russia might exploit the ICC against Ukraine through Global South intermediaries. Scenario 1: The Targeted Referral and Complementarity Challenge Three African ICC states parties, for example South Africa, Uganda, and Nigeria, jointly refer “the situation of alleged war crimes committed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine since 2014” to the Prosecutor. The referral explicitly invokes crimes against civilians in the Donbas, the shelling of Donetsk and Luhansk, and attacks on infrastructure using cluster munitions. The referring states argue that despite the existing 2022 referral, the Prosecutor has devoted disproportionate attention to Russian crimes and must formally open a dedicated investigation strand for Ukrainian forces. They submit a 500 page dossier compiled by a Nairobi based NGO funded by Russian shell companies, with affidavits from Russian speaking victims now residing in South Africa. The OTP is placed in a difficult position. If it dismisses the referral, the referring states escalate to the ASP, alleging selective justice. If it takes it seriously, it must allocate resources and publicly acknowledge an investigation into Ukrainian forces, something already occurring but not with the same public visibility. The optics of “African states forcing the West’s court to probe its ally” dominates global media. Simultaneously, the referring states file an amicus brief in the confirmation of charges proceedings against Russian suspects, arguing that the principle of complementarity requires the ICC to examine whether Ukrainian domestic investigations into its own forces are genuine. They point to a handful of token prosecutions in Ukraine with light sentences as evidence of impunity. If a Pre Trial Chamber were to endorse this argument, it could theoretically declare potential Ukrainian cases inadmissible before they start, but the more likely outcome is a requirement for Ukraine to provide detailed reports on domestic proceedings, bogging the system down and exposing Kyiv to intrusive scrutiny. Scenario 2: Article 15 Communication Blitz and Victim Activism A coalition of human rights NGOs from Bangladesh, Brazil, and Kenya, with shared funding and legal counsel, files a 1,200 page Article 15 communication in March 2026. It catalogues 217 alleged incidents of Ukrainian forces executing Russian prisoners of war, using human shields, targeting civilian convoys, and deploying banned anti personnel mines. Many of the allegations are sourced from Russian military bloggers and the Investigative Committee of Russia, repackaged with NGO logos. The communication requests the Prosecutor to immediately seek arrest warrants for the Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces and the Commander of the Special Operations Forces. Linked to this, 50 victims from Donetsk, now living in South Africa and Mozambique, apply for victim status, represented by a Johannesburg law firm with links to the ruling African National Congress. The victims demand participation in the ongoing Ukraine situation and request that the Chamber order the Prosecutor to interview them. The sheer volume of material forces the OTP’s Ukraine team to dedicate a sub team to process and investigate. Leaks to sympathetic media create a narrative that “the ICC is finally listening to Russian speaking victims.” Even if the allegations ultimately fail to produce charges, the process consumes years, divides the OTP’s attention, and generates headlines that Moscow amplifies. Scenario 3: The Budgetary Siege and ASP Resolutions At the annual ASP session in December 2026, the African Group, joined by several Latin American and Asian states, tables a resolution calling for “equitable allocation of resources in the Ukraine situation to avoid any appearance of victor’s justice.” The resolution requests the OTP to submit a public plan detailing the investigative steps taken regarding crimes allegedly committed by all parties, with specific benchmarks. In bilateral meetings, ambassadors from those states warn the Prosecutor that failure to demonstrate tangible progress on Ukrainian suspects will make it impossible for them to vote for the 2027 budget increase. Some hint at revisiting their own cooperation with the Court on outstanding arrest warrants. The Prosecutor, facing an unprecedented budget crunch, agrees to issue a detailed public report. The report, while measured, lists dozens of incidents under preliminary scrutiny involving Ukrainian personnel, including several that had not been previously disclosed. Russia’s Foreign Ministry immediately tweets that the report is a vindication of its long standing claims. Ukrainian officials protest, and a diplomatic crisis ensues, straining Western unity. Scenario 4: Politicized Amicus Briefs and Judicial Signaling A group of ten former judges and international law professors from the Global South, all of whom have criticized Western double standards, submit an amicus brief in the Ukraine situation. They argue that the OTP’s exclusive focus on Russian chain of command liability while ignoring Ukraine’s own superior responsibility for crimes committed by its forces violates the Rome Statute’s principle of equality of arms and the prohibition on discriminatory prosecution (Article 21(3)). They cite the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s decision in the Gotovina case and the ICC’s own Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, which requires the Office to consider the “gravity of the crimes and the interests of victims irrespective of the affiliation of the perpetrators.” They request the Pre Trial Chamber to issue a supervisory order. While the Chamber is likely to dismiss the brief as non justiciable, the judicial discussion it generates, recorded in a separate opinion by a dissenting judge, provides material for years of academic and diplomatic criticism. The episode further politicizes the Court and chills robust action against Russian high officials. Scenario 5: Deploying Complementarity to Shield Russian Suspects via Ukrainian Counter Cases An inventive scenario involves using the ICC’s complementarity principle in reverse. If Ukraine were to aggressively prosecute its own soldiers for international crimes, the ICC would be barred from prosecuting those individuals. But if Ukraine’s prosecutions are seen as insufficient, the door remains open for the ICC. Russia, through friendly states, could argue that Ukraine’s domestic processes are a sham, thereby preserving ICC jurisdiction over Ukrainian nationals. Simultaneously, Russia could assist Global South litigators in bringing civil claims in universal jurisdiction countries (such as Argentina or Senegal) against Ukrainian officials, creating a patchwork of legal jeopardy that makes senior Ukrainian commanders reluctant to travel. While universal jurisdiction cases are outside the ICC’s ambit, a coordinated multi forum lawfare campaign exerts pressure on the OTP to act first to retain institutional primacy. These scenarios are not mutually exclusive. A sophisticated Russian strategy would orchestrate them simultaneously, leveraging different allies for each track. 6. Barriers and Countervailing Forces Despite the political logic, numerous formidable barriers impede the full exploitation of the ICC against Ukraine. Prosecutorial Independence and Institutional Defence The OTP, under Prosecutor Khan, is acutely aware of attempts to instrumentalize the Court. The Office’s internal culture, reinforced after the bitter experience of the Iraq preliminary examination and the Afghanistan admissibility battle, has erected procedural firewalls. The Prosecutor has repeatedly emphasized that the Ukraine investigation is “evidence led, not politics led.” The OTP’s Strategic Plan 2023 2025 commits to charging decisions based on objective assessment of evidence and gravity. Any explicit campaign by Russia or its allies is likely to trigger a counter reaction: the OTP will be careful to avoid the appearance of caving to pressure, potentially making it more rigorous in its internal screening of Ukrainian cases, but also more determined to insulate high profile Russian cases from linkage. In practice, the sheer gravity and scale of Russian crimes the summary executions in Bucha, the systematic targeting of energy infrastructure, the deportation of children, the widespread sexual violence make them the most significant objects of investigation by any objective gravity metric. A credible OTP cannot neglect these in favour of smaller scale incidents. Evidentiary Hurdles and the Article 53 Standard To issue an arrest warrant, the Prosecutor must satisfy a Pre Trial Chamber that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” the suspect has committed a crime within the jurisdiction. This requires reliable evidence, corroborated witness testimony, forensic analysis, and, for command responsibility, proof of effective control. Russia and its proxies can generate large volumes of raw allegations and propaganda, but transforming that into evidence admissible under Article 69 is a different matter. The ICC has robust admissibility criteria that exclude evidence tainted by political bias. The OTP’s investigators, many of whom have extensive field experience, are trained to detect fabricated testimony. The Donbas “eyewitnesses” presented by Russian organized NGOs are likely to crumble under rigorous vetting. Furthermore, Ukrainian forces operate in a contested, transparent environment with extensive media coverage, open source intelligence, and international observer presence, making it harder to sustain spurious allegations without exposure. While real crimes by Ukrainian forces do occur, as in any armed conflict, their scale and systematic nature are far smaller than those of the invading army. The ICC’s gravity threshold directs the Prosecutor to focus on the “most serious crimes of concern to the international community.” A handful of battlefield excesses, even if proven, rarely reach that level unless they form part of a larger plan or policy. Complementarity and Ukraine’s Domestic Proceedings Ukraine has a functioning, albeit stressed, judicial system. It has prosecuted hundreds of Russian war crimes in absentia, but it has also opened investigations into its own forces. In 2022, the Office of the Prosecutor General reported investigations into several cases of alleged murder, ill treatment, and unlawful use of weapons by Ukrainian soldiers. Ukraine’s commitment to accountability is a cornerstone of its EU accession process. Under the Rome Statute’s complementarity principle, the ICC is a court of last resort; it can only prosecute if the state with jurisdiction is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. The ICC’s Pre Trial Chamber has interpreted this test to require a high bar, assessing whether national proceedings are a sham designed to shield the perpetrator. Ukraine’s demonstrated willingness, however imperfect, makes it very difficult for third states to argue that the entire Ukrainian justice system is unwilling or unable. Moreover, if Ukraine were to expedite genuine prosecutions of its own soldiers for any crimes that might attract ICC attention, it would pre empt ICC action. Kyiv has a strong incentive to do so, precisely to block instrumentalization. Russian proxies could try to challenge the genuineness of specific Ukrainian prosecutions, but the Court has so far been deferential to good faith national efforts. In the Georgia situation, the Pre Trial Chamber authorized an investigation only after finding that Russia (not Georgia) was not investigating. Similar reasoning would favour Ukraine. Political Fractures in the Global South Many states, such as Colombia, Chile, Senegal, and Japan (in the geopolitical West but often aligned with Southern perspectives on justice), have a genuine commitment to the Rome Statute system. The coordinated 2022 referral was joined by several Global South states, including Costa Rica, Colombia, and North Macedonia. Even among critical voices, interests diverge. South Africa’s ANC may harbour sympathy for Moscow, but South African judiciary and civil society are robustly independent. Nigeria’s foreign policy balances multiple axes. India, a non party, has strategic interests in both Russia and the West and is unlikely to expend diplomatic capital on lawfare adventures. The African Union has shifted from blanket anti ICC rhetoric to a more nuanced position following the appointment of a Gambian prosecutor and African judges. Building a stable coalition to sustain a concerted ICC campaign requires time and constant maintenance that Russia’s overstretched diplomacy may lack, especially as the Ukraine war drains its resources. Legal Norms Against Abuse of Process The Rome Statute and the Court’s inherent powers recognize the doctrine of abuse of process. If it becomes evident that a referral, communication, or victim application is part of a state orchestrated scheme to harass or politicize proceedings, the Chambers can dismiss such actions. While proving state orchestration is difficult, intelligence disclosures from Western services, investigative journalism, and leaks could expose the Russian hand behind proxy moves. Once exposed, the credibility of those moves evaporates, and the participating states risk reputational damage. In 2023, the ICC authorized an investigation into the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela I, but it did so after a referral by a group of states parties, a process closely watched for any political misuse. Future politically motivated referrals will face heightened scrutiny. The Court’s Legitimacy Imperative Ultimately, the ICC’s institutional survival depends on its perceived legitimacy. If it were to be seen as weaponized against a victim state that is actively cooperating with the Court and defending itself against aggression, its standing among Western and many non Western democracies would collapse. Major donors like the European Union, Japan, and Canada provide the majority of the Court’s budget. The Prosecutor, judges, and Registry are acutely aware of this dependency. While they must act independently, a radical shift in the Ukraine investigation’s targeting that appears to reward Russian lawfare would precipitate a funding and legitimacy crisis far greater than the manageable criticism of being one sided. The Court can survive allegations of anti Western bias more easily than allegations of serving an aggressor’s agenda. This structural reality imposes a powerful break on any drift toward instrumentalization. 7. Case Parallels: Afghanistan and African Situations To gauge the plausibility of Russian proxy exploitation, one can draw comparative lessons from other situations where political actors sought to steer the ICC. Afghanistan Situation and the Challenge of Asymmetrical Justice The Afghanistan investigation presents a closer analogue. The Prosecutor sought authorization to investigate crimes committed by the Taliban, Afghan National Security Forces, and US military and CIA personnel. The Pre Trial Chamber initially rejected the request, citing interests of justice and feasibility, a decision that was criticised as caving to US pressure and later overturned by the Appeals Chamber in 2020. The Afghan situation shows that the Court is capable of investigating all sides, including powerful Western actors. It also reveals that such investigations are exceptionally slow, resource intensive, and subject to non cooperation. For Russia, the lesson is that even if an investigation into Ukrainian forces moves forward, it may take a decade or more to yield results, while the parallel Russian track advances faster due to greater evidence and gravity. The asymmetry of capacity and evidence means that a Ukrainian focused investigation would likely lag far behind, failing to deliver the timely political equivalence Moscow seeks. African Situations and the Selectivity Critique The ICC’s early focus on African defendants under self referrals generated a powerful blowback. The African Union’s 2013 resolution urging members to consider withdrawal, the Kenya Assembly of States Parties pushback, and the Burundi withdrawal all stem from perceptions that the Court was a pawn of Western powers. Russia and China have consistently supported African criticisms in the Security Council and the ASP. This history demonstrates that the Global South can effectively weaponize the selectivity narrative to delegitimize the Court and influence its behaviour. The OTP under Fatou Bensouda initiated preliminary examinations in Palestine, Georgia, Ukraine, and Afghanistan, partly to counter the Africa bias critique. The current OTP is similarly sensitive. Moscow’s exploitation strategy would ride this established current, but with a crucial difference: the accused would be a non African, Western aligned state, which reduces the racial dimension and complicates the colonial narrative. Many African states, while critiquing double standards, may be reluctant to expend political capital shielding a permanent UN Security Council member engaged in blatant aggression when their real interest is in seeing the principle of universal accountability applied to all, including the powerful. The aggregate lesson is that politics can influence the ICC’s agenda, delay proceedings, and shape public perception, but cannot easily flip the Court’s judicial outcomes. The Court’s internal legal culture, evidentiary discipline, and the weight of the most grave crimes create a gravitation toward objective legal determination that resists raw instrumentalization. 8. Assessment and Outlook: Lawfare’s Limits and Risks Synthesizing the legal, political, and institutional analysis, this investigation concludes that Russia can partially exploit the ICC through Global South proxies, but full capture is beyond reach. The distinction between influencing the Court’s process and dictating its outcomes is crucial. What Russia can realistically achieve is a “lawfare of equivalence.” Through orchestrated referrals, Article 15 communications, victim applications, amicus briefs, and ASP budget politics, Moscow can compel the OTP to publicly acknowledge and investigate allegations against Ukrainian forces more thoroughly than it might otherwise prioritize. It can generate diplomatic noise that erodes the clarity of Ukraine’s victim status in some Global South capitals and among certain Western left wing constituencies. It can divert some OTP resources, force the Court into defensive procedural postures, and create an opening for Russian propaganda. It can prolong proceedings and create a cloud of legal jeopardy over mid ranking Ukrainian commanders that inhibits their post war diplomatic roles. All of this serves Russian strategic interests by muddying the moral waters and imposing a cost on Ukraine’s alliance with the ICC. However, there are strong grounds to believe that Russia will fail to obtain ICC arrest warrants against senior Ukrainian political or military leaders on a scale comparable to those against Russian officials. The evidentiary bar, the complementarity principle, the gravity threshold, and the OTP’s institutional interest in preserving its credibility all militate against it. The Court will investigate credible crimes, and some Ukrainian soldiers may eventually face charges. That outcome, while politically uncomfortable for Kyiv, is consistent with the principle of equal application of the law and would not necessarily signify Russian success. Indeed, genuine ICC scrutiny of Ukrainian conduct, provided it is proportionate and legally grounded, could immunize the Court against allegations of bias and strengthen its overall legitimacy. Russian proxies demanding such scrutiny may, paradoxically, reinforce the very rule of law they seek to undermine. The greatest risk for Ukraine and its allies is not a hostile ICC but a paralysed one. If the OTP, facing a storm of Global South criticism and linked budget threats, becomes overly cautious in pursuing Russian chain of command cases, the overall pace of accountability for the crime of aggression and core atrocities will slow. This is why Western states, as the Court’s primary funders and supporters, must engage proactively with Global South concerns rather than dismiss them. They should robustly fund the OTP’s Ukraine work, encourage it to transparently report its investigation into all parties, and support victim outreach across all affected communities. At the same time, they should work through the ASP to strengthen the Court’s integrity mechanisms against abuse of process, without curtailing legitimate access for victims from any side. A deeper challenge lies in the structural asymmetry of international criminal justice. The ICC does not prosecute the crime of aggression for non state parties, and the proposed Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, while supported by a coalition, remains aspirational. So long as aggression itself is the unpunished fountainhead of all downstream war crimes, any attempt to create equivalence between aggressor and defender will enjoy a certain moral plausibility in parts of the world where memories of Western interventions remain raw. Addressing this asymmetry through a genuinely inclusive and principled accountability framework is the long term antidote to Russian instrumentalization.